Abstract: The basic principle is "A function is easy to evaluate but its invert is infeasible unless a secret key is known".
I. INTRODUCTION
Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) are suitable for implementation on devices with limited memory and computational capability such as smart cards and also with limited power such as wireless handheld devices. This is due to the fact that elliptic curves over large finite fields provide the same security level as other cryptosystems such as RSA for much smaller key sizes.
Considering power analysis attacks, there are two main types that were presented by Kocher et al. These are simple and differential power analysis attacks (referred to as SPA and DPA respectively).
Both of them are based on monitoring the power consumption of a cryptographic token while executing an algorithm that manipulates the secret key.
The traces of the measured power are then analyzed to obtain significant information about the key. In some cases the key can be totally compromised and in others the search space of the key can be reduced to a computationally affordable size. In SPA, a single power trace can reveal large features of the algorithm being executed such as the iterations of the loop. Moreover, cryptosystem-specific operations such as point doubling and adding in ECCs can be identified [3] . In order to resist this SPA attack, the steps of the algorithm need to be uniform across different executions. Hence, DPA attacks are, in general, more powerful than the SPA attack. Randomization of the data processed at some instant is essential in resisting this type of attacks.
Electromagnetic emanations present another powerful side channel since the information is leaked from the device via more than one channel and is a function of space as well as of time. In [2] , Agrawal et al. presented both simple and differential electromagnetic analysis attacks on smart cards and on a Palm pilot . In these attacks they conclude that software countermeasures rely on signal information reduction, which is achieved by "randomization and/or frequent key refreshing within the computation", which agrees with the concept of resisting DPA attacks.
The point addition operation consists of finite field operations carried in the underlying field K. We denote the field inversion by I, the multiplication by M, the squaring by S. The point addition is denoted by A. When the two operands of the addition are the same point, the operation is referred to as point doubling and is denoted by D.
II. WINDOW METHODS
This method is sometimes referred to as m−ary method. There are different versions of window methods . What is common among them is that, if the window width is w, some multiples of the point P up to (2 w − 1)P are precomputed and stored and k is processed w bits at a time.
k is recoded to the radix 2 w . k can be recoded in a way so that the average density of the nonzero digits in the recoding is 1/(w +  ), where 0    2 depends on the algorithm.
Let the number of precomputed points be t, in the Precomputation stage, each point requires either a doubling or an addition to be computed also depending on the algorithm.
This ECSM method is suitable for unknown or fixed point P. The cost is Storage: t points, where 2 
A. Simultaneous multiple point multiplication
This method is used to compute kP +lS where P may be a known point. This algorithm was referred to as Shamir's trick in [10] . If k and l are n-bit integers, then their binary representations are written in a 2 × n matrix called the exponent array. Given width w, the values iP +jS are calculated for doubled w times and the current 2 × w window over the exponent array determines the precomputed point that is to be added to the accumulator. Algorithm A. Simultaneous multiple point multiplication (Shamir-Strauss method) 
Return(Q).
Storage: 2 w 2 − 1 points. For w = 1, 3 points.
For w = 2, 15 points. Precomputation:
For w = 1, 1 A. For w = 2, 1 D + 11 A.
Expected running time: Using sliding windows can save about 1 4 of the precomputed points and decrease the number of additions to
, which is about 9% saving for w  {2, 3}.
B. Interleaving method
This method is also a multiple point multiplication method, and we want to compute  j j P k for points P j and integers j K . In the comb and simultaneous multiplication methods, each of the precomputed values is a sum of the multiples of the input points. In the interleaving method, each precomputed value is simply a multiple of one of the input points. Hence, the required storage and the number of point additions at the precomputation phase is decreased at the expense of the number of point additions in the main loop. This method is flexible in that each k j can have a different representation, e.g., different window size, as if a separate execution of a window method is performed for each k j P j with the doubling step performed jointly on a common accumulator, as shown in [12] . As an illustration, we provide the following algorithm that computes kP + lS where both k and l are represented to the same base 2 w .
Algorithm B. Interleaving method
, and P, S  E(F q ).
Output: kP + lS.
Precomputation. Compute iP and iS for all
i  [0, 2 w − 1]. 2. Q  K 1  d P. 3. Q  Q L 1  d S. 4. for i from d − 2 down to 0 do 4.1 Q  2 w Q. 4.2 Q  Q + K i P. 4.3 Q  Q + L i S.
Return(Q).
Storage: 2 
C. SPA Attack on ECCs and its Countermeasures
Coron [3] has transferred the power analysis attacks to ECCs and has shown that an unaware implementation of EC operations can easily be exploited to mount an SPA attack. Moreover, it may also enable to recognize the exact instruction that has been executed. For example, if the difference in power consumption between point doubling (D) and point addition (A) is obvious in their respective power traces, then, by investigating one power trace of a complete execution of a double-and-add algorithm, the bits of the scalar k are revealed. That is, whenever a D is followed by A, the corresponding bit is k i = 1, otherwise if D is followed by another D, then k i = 0. This sequence of point operations is referred to as the DA sequence.
Window methods process the key on a digit (window) level. The basic version of this method, that is where = 0 in Section A, is inherently uniform since in most iterations, w D operations are followed by 1 A, except for possibly when the digit is 0. Therefore, fixed-sequence window methods were proposed in order to recode the digits of the key such that the digit set does not include 0. 
D. DPA Attack on ECCs and its Countermeasures
As for the SPA attack, Kocher et al. were first to introduce the DPA attack on a smart card implementation of DES. Techniques to strengthen the attack and a theoretical basis for it were presented by Messerges et al. in [3] . Coron applied the DPA attack to ECCs [3] .
In order to resist DPA attacks, it is important to randomize the value of the long-term key involved in the ECSM across the different executions. Some of the countermeasures that were based on randomizing the key representation were proven to be inadequate since the intermediate point computed in the accumulator Q at certain iteration remained one of two possible values. The constancy of the value of this intermediate point is an integral part in the success of first-order DPA attacks.
A potential DPA countermeasure is known as key splitting. It is based on randomly splitting the key into two parts such that each part is different in every ECSM execution. An additive splitting using subtraction is attributed to Clavier and Joye. It is based on computing kP = (k − r)P + rP, (I)
The authors mention that the idea of splitting the data was abstracted in [5] . where r is a n-bit random integer, that is, of the same bit length as k. Alternatively, Ciet and Joye [8] suggest the following additive splitting using division, that is, k is written as
Hence, if we let k 1 = (k mod r), k 2 2 =   r / k and S = rP, we can compute KP = k 1 p + k 2 P (2) where the bit length of r is n/2. They also suggest that (2) should be evaluated with Shamir-Strauss method as in Algorithm C. However, they did not mention whether the same algorithm should be used to evaluate (1) 
III. KEY SPLITTING METHODS

A. Introduction
We discuss different the forms of key splitting along with their strengths and weaknesses. We also discuss the candidate SPA-resistant algorithms and compare the resulting performance when combined with each form of key splitting. At the end of the chapter, we present countermeasures to DPA attacks on the ECDSA and the ECMQV algorithms.
This approach was suggested by Clavier and Joye in [5] and revisited by Ciet [6] as follows. In order to compute the point kP, the n-bit key k is written as k = k 1 + k 2 , such that k 1 = k − r and k 2 = r, where r is a random integer of length n bits. Then kP is computed as kP = k 1 P + k 2 P.
(1) It is important to note that each of the terms of should be evaluated separately and their results combined at the end using point addition. That is the multiple-point multiplication methods that use a common accumulator to save doubling operations. Whether at the bit level (w ≡ 1) or window level (w > 1)-should not be used, even when a countermeasure against SPA is employed. This observation is based on the following lemma. Let  n , . . . , k 2 0 ) 2 from the most significant end down to the least significant end. Hence, at the end of iteration j, the accumulator Q contains the value Q = k
We can write k, k 1 and k 2 as
Since k = k 1 + k 2 we have
and
The DPA attack would proceed in the same way, whether the algorithm processes a single bit or a digit per iteration, though it would be more involved in the latter case depending on the digit size. The attacker can double the number of traces gathered and compute the necessary intermediate points as if there was no countermeasure in place.
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